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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DESERET LIVESTOCK COMPANY,
a corporation, and
ANSCHUTZ LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No. 14008

vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action against an electric utility
brought by two of its customers claiming damages to irrigation
pumps and loss of crops and forage allegedly resulting from
negligence of the utility and for breach of contract to
supply electric power and for breach of implied warranty of
fitness of electrical power supplied to said customers.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
':'*•*

The case was tried in the District Court of Salt

Lake County, Utah, before Honorable Stewart M. Hanson,
sitting without a jury.

At the close of plaintiff's case

defendant moved for dismissal.

The Court reserved a ruling

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 2on the motion and defendant proceeded with its case.

Upon

conclusion of the trial, the Court granted defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

^

Plaintiffs-Appellants seek to have the judgment of
the trial court reversed and remanded for trial or, alternatively, for judgment for plaintiffs and remand for determination of damages.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Defendant does not agree with the statement of
facts as set forth in plaintiffs1 brief in that such statement
omits certain material facts relative to damages, to the
time of occurrence of the incident giving rise to this
action, to the number of customers supplied on the same
electric distribution line which supplied service to plaintiffs,
to the physical electric distribution system on plaintiffs1
properties and in other respects.

Defendant therefore

submits its own Statement of Material Facts.
For purposes of brevity, plaintiffs Deseret Livestock Company and Anschutz Land and Livestock Company, Inc.,
will be referred to as Deseret and Anschutz; defendant Utah
Power & Light Company will be referred to as Utah Power.
Deseret and Anschutz are both corporations and both
owned certain ranching and livestock property in Skull Valley,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 3Tooele County, Utah.

Subsequent to the commencement of the

action, Deseret sold all of its properties to Skull Valley
Company, a Utah limited partnership (R. 2). Deseret and
Anschutz are both customers of Utah Power and receive electric
power for various purposes, including the operation of
electric motors and pumps used for irrigation pumping.
Plaintiffs are both served from what is known as the Skull
Valley No. 1 Circuit (Ex. 6-P, R. 49-50).

Approximately

sixty-five customers, including seventeen irrigation pumping
customers, are supplied with service from this same line (R.
50) .
Electric power is delivered to both plaintiffs at a
specified point of delivery, beyond which point they each use
such power for their respective electric requirements.
Deseret owns, operates and maintains its own electric distibution lines with associated transformers, fuses and other
devices, which lines run from the point of delivery to
various points of use on Deseretfs property.
Mr. Beck, Manager of the Deseret ranch, testified
that the various distribution lines owned by Deseret are (1)
one-half mile long, (2) one hundred yards long, (3) one
hundred yards long, and (4) one-quarter mile long (R. 14).
Deseret and Utah Power entered into an electric
service agreement (Ex. 2-P). Said agreement refers to and
incorporates Utah Powerfs Electric Service Regulations as
filed with the Public Service Commission of Utah.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. A. R.

- 4 Dunn, Manager of Rates for Utah Power, testified (R. 70) that
such regulations set forth the conditions, definitions and
characteristics under which electric service is supplied to
a customer.

Said regulations provide in part that Utah Power

does not guarantee its service against irregularities and
interruptions and further that the customer assumes all
responsibility on its side from the point of delivery for the
service supplied and the electrical installation used therewith (R. 72).
Mr. Beck, Manager of Deseret, testified (R. 13)
that around the 18th or 20th of June of 1970, in the morning,
he discovered that the irrigation pumps were not operating.
He immediately called Mr. Al Nytch of Utah Electric Motor to
repair same (R. 8). He called Mr. Nytch in the morning and
he came out the same day (R. 13). Mr. Nytch, in his deposition,
received in evidence, stated that he was informed the pumps
went out the prior evening and he was called but not reached
at that time. Mr. Beck did not notify Utah Power relative to
any problem with the irrigation pumps (R. 18). Three pumps
were operating on the Deseret ranch at the time (R. 17) and
one pump was damaged (Dep. 8). The damaged pump was out of
service for sixty to seventy days (R. 9). It was used for
pumping water for irrigating five hundred acres used for
growing hay and forage (R. 9). Mr. Beck testified that
because of the unavailability of water on this tract, one
thousand tons of hay were not produced and two or three
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 5months of forage for one thousand cattle was lost (R. 10).
Mr. Daniel Freed, Vice President of Deseret, testified (R.
20) that the hay was worth $30 to $35 per ton and would have
cost $7 to $8 per ton to harvest.

He further testified (R.

21) that the forage was valued at $.15 per day per head of
cattle.

He stated that it was not necessary for Deseret to

purchase any feed to replace that which was claimed lost
because of the lack of water (R. 23).
Mr. Nytch stated that the damage to the pump was
caused by a sustained outage followed by a phase reversal
which occurs when one electric line is switched with another
(Dep. 11) and that such occurrence must be man made and can
only be man corrected (Dep. 25-26).

The cost of repairs to

the Deseret pumps attributable to the phase reversal was
$7,837.11 (Ex. 3-P, 4-P and R. 22).
Mr. Max Arneson, Manager of Anschutz's ranch,
testified that he was in Wasatch County when he received a
call from Mr. George Slaugh, foreman of the Anschutz Skull
Valley ranch, informing him that one of the irrigation pumps
was not working (R. 30). Mr. Arneson was unable to recall
the date of the call other than that it was sometime in
June, 1970 (R. 31). He testified the pump was out for sixty
to seventy days but that repairs were all complete by August
4, 1970 (R. 32). He stated the repair invoice was paid in
September, was dated August 4, 1970, and that repairs were
completed by that date (R. 32). There were two pumps on the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 6Anschutz ranch but only one was damaged (R. 27, 38). Anschutz
did not purchase any feed to replace that not produced
because of the lack of water (R. 32). Mr. Arneson stated
that there are one or two ranches having wells and pumps
located between the Deseret and Anschutz ranches (R. 33).
He testified the value of the lost forage at $4.50 per head
of cattle per month, that the irrigated property served by
the damaged pump would serve three hundred head of cattle,
that the forage was lost for a three-month period (R. 29-30)
and that: the repair bill for pump repairs was $1,679.84
(R. 29-30).

Mr. George Slaugh, Anschutz!s foreman, testified

that when he discovered the pump was not working, he called
Mr. Arneson who instructed him to call Mr. Nytch to make the
repairs (R. 37). He stated the problem occurred around the
18th or 20th of June (R. 38). Mr. Nytch stated that Mr.
Slaugh called him approximately five days or so after the
incident: occurred (Dep. 4 ) .
Mr. Nytch stated (Dep. 19) that the damage to the
Anschutz pump was caused by phase reversal and that the
Deseret and Anschutz pumps now have devices to protect
against such phase reversal but neither had such devices at
the time of the pump failure (Dep. 9).
Arthur J. Nielson, Jr., witness for plaintiffs, and
Dale Brown, witness for defendant, both testified (R. 100
and R. 61) that a phase reversal occurs from a switching or
reversing of conductors from their proper order on a three
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 7phase circuit. Mr. Brown testified that a phase reversal
would effect all users on the same circuit (R. 69), that it
.^. could not be accomplished without an outage, that it could
not be done with hot live lines (R. 91) and that it would
take ten to fifteen minutes to physically accomplish the
reversal (R. 92). :
Plaintiffs1 witness Nielson testified (R. 105106) that a phase reversal need not occur on a pole-mounted
j electric line but can occur on the ground at the terminal
box of the motor or could occur at the substation or generating
plant or at any place in between (R. 107). He also stated
:

(R. 107) that a phase reversal to cause damage to both the
Deseret and Anschutz properties would have to result from
action taking place above the Anschutz ranch and toward the
substation or generating plant.
Mr. David Robinson, attorney for plaintiffs and
Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer of Deseret, stated
(R. 45) that a demand letter written by him on February 11,
1971, was, to his knowledge, the first notification given
to Utah Power relative to the subject occurrence.
Mr. Gail A. Parker, District Representative of
Utah Power's Tooele office stated (ft. 50) that approximately
sixty-five customers are served from the same line that
supplies service to plaintiffs.

He also testified that no

trouble calls or outage reports were received from either
Deseret or Anschutz or any other customer served from the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 8subject electrical line during the period around June 18,
1970, or for several days prior to and after that date and
that no work was being done during this period at the Skull
Valley Substation (R. 51-52, 54).

ft

-

At the conclusion of plaintiffs1 case, defendant
made a Motion to Dismiss (R. 43) for lack of proof in
establishing any negligence or liability on the part of
defendant.

The motion was taken under advisement (R. 44)

and defendant, without waiving same, proceeded to put on its
case.

Upon the close of all evidence, the matter was argued

and taken under advisement.

The Court subsequently issued a

memorandum decision granting defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Thereafter, an Order of Dismissal was entered and an objection to same was filed because said Order did not contain
Findings and Conclusions.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law, together with an Order or Dismissal were then made
and entered and plaintiffs filed their objections thereto.
After a denial of such objections, this appeal was taken.
ARGUMENT
- •••

- • . .

POINT I •" • •'• t

THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT ARE
PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT AND THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN SUCH A MANNER AS WILL SUPPORT
THE JUDGMENT.
.-''.• .

There are numerous cases supporting the general

proposition of law that the judgment and proceedings in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 9trial court are presumed to be correct and the trial court's
findings should be reviewed in such a manner as will support
the judgment.
956.

Leithead v. Adair, 10 Utah 2d 282, 351 P.2d

It is well established that the duty of the appella-fe

court is to review the evidence in a light most favorable to
the findings.

Parrish v. Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P.2d

642; Petrie v. General Contracting Company, 17 Utah 2d 408,
413 P.2d 600. This Court succinctly stated the rule in
Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Company, 3 Utah 2d 247, 282
P.2d 335, and it was there stated as follows:

,.

When the Court has made findings and
entered judgment thereon as was done here,
it is then our duty to review the
evidence in the light most favorable
to the findings, and they must be
allowed to stand if reasonable
minds could agree with them. Likewise
every reasonable intendment ought
to be indulged in favor of the
validity and correctness of the
judgment under review, and it will
not be disturbed unless the appellant
meets his burden of affirmatively
showing error.

T

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED ALL OF THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY BOTH PARTIES IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SAME ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE
_ EVIDENCE PRESENTED
: v
s
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of proof of any
negligence or liability on the part of defendant (R. 43).
The motion was taken under advisement and defendant proceeded
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 10 to put on evidence without waiving the motion.

The motion

was, therefore, continuing and was recognized by the Court
and by all parties as being a continuing motion.
Rule 41(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
specifically provides that if a motion to dismiss is made at
the conclusion of plaintiffs1 case, the Court, as trier of
the facts, may then determine them or may decline to render
any judgment until the close of all the evidence.

The trial

court took the matter under advisement and at the close of
all evidence then granted the continuing motion to dismiss.
The trial court's reservation of a ruling on the
motion at the time it was made was nothing more than a
determination that judgment should not be entered at that
time but should be reserved until the close of all the
evidence in accordance with the provisions of Rule 41(b).
Although the Court's ruling was here made at the conclusion
of the case and pursuant to a continuing motion to dismiss,
the situation is analogous to that where such a motion is
denied at the conclusion of plaintiffs1 case and then
granted after all the evidence is presented.

In such

situation the apparent reversal by the court of its own
previous ruling is a circumstance fully contemplated by the
language of Rule 41(b) which specifically permits the court
to render judgment at the close of plaintiffs' case or
" . . . he may decline to render any judgment until the close
of all the evidence."

In that regard, 5 Moore's Federal

by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Practice, Digitized
at page
1159,
states:
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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:,•-•.
•:•-•

-•

As previously noted, he may conclude
that it is inadvisable to sustain
defendant's motion midway in the trial
and that the trial should be completed,
even though technically he may sustain
defendant's motion. The denial amounts
to nothing more than a refusal to enter
judgment at that time; constitutes only
a tentative ruling; and does not preclude
the trial judge from making at the close
of the case findings and determinations
at variance with his prior tentative
ruling.
In the instant case, where the court determined to

hear all of the evidence before rendering its decision on
defendant's Motion to Dismiss, it would be clearly unreasonable and improper for the court to base such decision on
only a part of the evidence.
The trial court made fourteen Findings of Fact,
all of which were fully supported by the evidence and which are
substantially included, in narrative form, in the Statement
of Material Facts herein, with references to record pages.
Plaintiffs principally take issue with Findings of
Fact No. 4 and Conclusion of Law No. 1.

Such Finding,

in substance, is that Utah Power at or near the time plaintiffs
claim the irrigation pumps were damaged did not (1) experience
any electrical outage or disturbance on its Skull Valley
line, (2) did not receive any complaint or trouble call from
any of the sixty-five customers served by said line, and
(3) did not perform any maintenance or repair work on said
l i n e .

•.>'••?

/

:

. • > • • • •

'.:-.•'

;
.

••••

r

\ -••

I(L . Evidence to support such finding clearly appears
by the Howardoffered
W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law School,
BYU.employee in
from the Digitized
testimony
by Mr.
Parker,
the
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 12 charge of Utah Power's Tooele office (R. 51-52, 54).
Plaintiffs offered no evidence to the contrary.

Exhibit 6-P

illustrates the total Skull Valley circuit showing all the
customers served from this line.

Defendant's witness Brown

testified (R. 91-92) that a phase reversal could not be
accomplished without an outage and that it would take a
minimum of ten to fifteen minutes to physically reverse the
conductors and create a phase reversal.

Plaintiffs' witness

Nytch agreed that an outage was necessary to cause a phase
reversal and testified that the outage would ". . . have to
have been sustained for a while.ff

(Dep. 11). ~ ^

The lack of any communication to Utah Power at the
time in question from any of the sixty-five customers
supplied with service by the same line as that serving i^
plaintiffs, who would have experienced an electrical outage
for ten to fifteen minutes, combined with the fact that no
repairs were being performed or were required on such line at
the time in question, leads to the inescapable conclusion
that the damage sustained by plaintiffs were isolated
instances occurring only on their properties and affecting
only their facilities.

,

.*..•-• . :•••

In view of the evidence presented on this issue by
defendant and the lack of any contrary evidence presented by
plaintiffs, the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 14 was
fully supported by the evidence and based, in part, on such
findings, the Court properly concluded that defendant was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 13 not negligent in the operation or maintenance of its electrical
lines in supplying service to its customers.
POINT III
RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE
Applicant alleges that the instant case presents a
proper factual situation for application of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.

This court in numerous cases has considered

the doctrine and the factual elements required for its
application are well establishedin this jurisdiction.

Signi-

ficantly, the court has on several occasions dealt with the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as specifically applied to
public utility service.
In Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 108 P.2d
254 (1940), an action was brought for injuries and damages
sustained as a result of a natural gas explosion occurring
in a pipe beneath a rental unit of Utah Motor Park.

The gas

company supplied gas to the motor park at two meters. The
motor park then piped the gas to the furnaces and ranges in
individual cabins within the park.

The gas company had no

control over the gas pipes and appliances within the motor
park and beyond the gas meters.

There is no evidence of

specific negligence on the part of the gas company, and
plaintiff sought to have such negligence established by
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

The court

there held that the doctrine could not be invoked against
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 14 the gas company because it did not have any control over
l<

the gas facilities where the explosion occurred.

A more thorough treatment of the subject is found
in the frequently cited case of Wightman v. Mountain
Fuel Supply Co., 5 Utah 2d 373, 302 P.2d 471 (1956).

This was

an action seeking damages resulting from a natural gas
explosion in a private residence.
all the piping to the meter.

The gas company installed

All piping beyond the meter

and to the individual gas appliances had been done by a
local plumber.

This court, in holding that the evidence was

insufficient to justify submission of the case to a jury
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, stated as follows:

*;

In order to invoke this doctrine it is
generally recognized that the following
elements must be present: (1) That the
accident was of a kind which, in the
ordinary course of events, would not
have happened had due care been observed;
(2) That it happened irrespective of any
participation by the plaintiff; and (3)
*""'
That the cause thereof was something
under the management or control of the
defendant, or for which it is responsible.
It is to be conceded that elements (1)
and (2) above are satisfied by the facts
in the instant case. It is element No.
(3) that here gives us concern. This
^ *
requisite is generally phrased in terms
of "exclusive control11 over the instrumentality which caused the injury. However,
as pointed out by Dean Prosser, the use
. o f such terminology is often not realistically
applicable to the situation. He makes
reference to examples of malfunctioning r
machinery, defective appliances and
other situations where the instrumentality
has passed beyond the control of the
person responsible for its condition and
,
is being used by and under the complete
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rT

_ ,

v

control of the plaintiff. As suggested
by that eminent authority, it would seem
more accurate to appraise the situation
in terms of the defendant's responsibility
for the instrumentality, its condition
or function, rather than merely its
control. Whether it is in the defendant's
exclusive control or not, if the evidence
reasonably eliminates other explanations
than the defendant's negligence, that
provides the basis upon which the jury
may be permitted to infer that it was
defendant's negligence which resulted in
the injury. We are therefore not here
concerned with what degree of control
the gas company had over the pipes
leading into the meter and the meter
itself which it had installed. We
proceed upon the assumption that the gas
company was responsible for that part of
the system, leaving the responsibility
upon the Wightmans for their house
piping, furnace and gas water heater.
This brings us to the issue, crucial to
the plaintiff's case, whether her
evidence was sufficient upon which to
base a finding that the source of the
explosion was in the area for which the
gas company was responsible. Such proof
cannot rest upon speculation or conjecture,
nor upon a mere choice of probabilities.
To give rise to a jury question there
must be something in the evidence from
which the jury could reasonably believe
that there is a greater probability that
the explosion occurred in that part of
the installation than in the pipes or
appliances installed by and under the
care of the Wightmans. Only if there is
some such basis in the evidence would
there be any foundation to permit the
jury, under res ipsa loquitur, to infer
that some defect or lack of due care in
the gas company's part of the installation
caused the leak and the resulting
explosion.
The standards set forth in the Wightman case

were later affirmed in Talbot v. L.D.S. Hospital, 21 Utah 2d
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 16 73, 440 P.2d 872 (1968), and in Lund v. Mountain Fuel Supply
Company, 15 Utah 2d 10, 386 P.2d 408 (1963).

;

A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Montana,
Hash v. Montana Power Company, 524 P.2d 1092 (1974), is one
of many from other jurisdictions which reaches the same
conclusion as that of the Wightman case with respect to the
application of res ipsa loquitur.

In that case, which

concerned a fire originating in a meter box affixed to
plaintiff's building, the court in holding that res ipsa
loquitur was not applicable stated as follows:
To hold that defendant must supply an
explanation for every fire that occurs
on private property to which it supplies
electricity, when it can be shown that
the fire developed through arcing in the
meter box would have virtually the force
and effect of making defendant strictly
liable for injuries which occur without
proof of negligence on its part.
1

u

Even if it might be determined that a
power company is in the same relative
position to the general public as that
of a common carrier and, therefore, as a
matter of public policy, it should be
required to explain accidents which
occur through its equipment, this case
does not fall within that principle. The
fire occurred on plaintiff's property
within equipment owned by it. There is
no reason to believe that defendant is
in a better position to explain how the
accident happened than is plaintiff.
In the foregoing Montana case, the theory was

advanced by plaintiff's expert witness, in the absence of
any specific showing of defendant's negligence, that the
fire was caused by a power surge through the electric lines
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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That theory was apparently

rejected by the jury in view of the power company's evidence,
similar to evidence presented in the instant case, that no
irregularities in electric service were brought to the power
company's attention by its other customers and that no
defects were found in the service lines.
The facts of the instant case, particularly with
regard to the necessary element of control by the defendant,
clearly do not fall within that type of case to which the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be applied.

The physical

manner in which electric service is supplied to plaintiffs is
far different from that where a short drop line conveys
power from a distribution line at the rear of a residence or
building lot to a meter affixed to a house or building.
Electric power is delivered to plaintiffs at certain metering
points from which it is then conveyed through plaintiffs' own
lines and associated facilities to various points of use on
their respective ranches.

Plaintiffs' witness Beck, in his

testimony (R. 14), described four customer-owned lines on the
Deseret ranch that are respectively one-half mile long, one
hundred yards long, one hundred yards long, and one-quarter
mile long.

These lines, together with transformers, fuses

and other devices are owned, operated and maintained by
Deseret.

Utah Power has no control whatever over these

lines or their operation or maintenance.

Accordingly, while

the damaged pumps were both owned, operated and maintained
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- 18 by plaintiffs on their own respective properties, the additional element is present here, particularly in the case of
Deseret, that the power to serve such pumps is conveyed on
their own electric facilities at various, but substantial,
distances from the metering point to the actual point of
use.

The requisite element of defendant's control is completely

lacking.
Plaintiffs rely on the contention that the court
should disregard all of the traditional control factors and
find that res ipsa loquitur applies because the electric
power was "faulty.11

Under such theory plaintiffs allege

that consideration need not be given to such independent
factors as referred to above, i.e., the damage occurring
solely on plaintiffs1 properties, occurring to their electrical
equipment, the operation and maintenance of which are under
their exclusive control, and the occurrence of damage at a
considerable distance from the point where electric power
is delivered to the interconnected electrical facilities
owned by plaintiffs.

This contention, relative to control by

the defendant, was fully considered and disposed of by this
court in the Wightman case.

On that issue the court stated:

Finally, plaintiff makes the contention
that it was not the pipes, appliances or
meter which caused the explosion, but
the gas itself, which is under the
exclusive management and control of
defendant, so the rule of res ipsa
loquitur would apply. The position
cannot be sustained. If such were the
case, the rule could be invoked against
the supplier of gas in any case of
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- 19 injury resulting therefrom, regardless
of whether the facilities were installed
by the gas company and regardless of the
amount of control or the kind of care
exercised over them by others. This
would be an impractical and insuperable
burden which is not imposed by the law
in Utah nor of other jurisdictions.

, ,.

-*,..

One additional factor that must be considered in
determining whether or not negligence should be predicated on
the theory of res ipsa loquitur relates to the evidence
regarding the time when each plaintiff sustained damage to
its respective pump.

There is a complete absence of competent

evidence that the damage to the respective pumps resulted from
a simultaneous occurrence.

No showing was made that the

incidents were simultaneous and, to the contrary, the evidence is
completely conflicting in this regard.

Mr. Beck (Deseret)

stated the damage occurred around the 18th or 20th of June and
he immediately called Mr. Nytch (R. 13). Mr. Nytch stated
he was called on June 21 (Dep. 17). Mr. Arneson (Anschutz)
placed the time of the pump damage as sometime in June (R. 31).
Mr. Slaugh (Anschutz) testified the incident occurred f!. . .
somewhere

around the 18th or 20th of June, somewhere there

. . . ," (R. 38) and he immediately called Mr. Arneson and Mr.
Nytch (R. 37). Mr. Nytch stated Mr. Slaugh called him five
days or so after the incident occurred (Dep. 4). It is
apparent that this evidence not only fails to establish that
the pump damage occurred simultaneously on both properties, but
there is no clear showing as to the specific time the damage
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- 20 occurred on either property.

Further, and indicative of

the lack of unanimity in establishing a believable time of
occurrence, Mr. Arneson stated the Anschutz pump was out
of service for sixty to seventy days (R. 29) but that repairs
were completed by August 4 (R. 32). The obvious conclusion
drawn from that testimony of the manager of the Anschutz
Ranch is that the damage to its pump occurred between May 24
and June 4.
POINT IV
1

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT DEFENDANT
DID NOT BREACH THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT TO SUPPLY ELECTRIC
SERVICE TO PLAINTIFF DESERET OR THE IMPLIED AGREEMENT
TO SUPPLY PLAINTIFF ANSCHUTZ
An electric service agreement between Utah Power
and Deseret was introduced and received in evidence as
Exhibit 2-P.

No similar agreement between Utah Power and

Anschutz is in evidence but plaintiffs in Point V of their
brief nevertheless refer to agreements with both parties and, in
fact, refer therein to specific terms of an agreement with Hatch
(Anschutz) regarding amounts of kilowatts, cycles and volts of
power to be supplied under such non-offered agreement.
With respect to the one electric service agreement
that is in evidence (Ex. 2-P), the agreement specifically
provides that it is subject to the Company's Electric Service
Regulations, designated as Original Regulations, P.S.C.U.
No. 8, which were attached thereto and made a part thereof
(R. 71). Digitized
These
regulations were described by Mr. A. R.
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 21 Dunn, Utah Power's Manager of Rates, as being a set of rules
setting forth the conditions, definitions and characteristics
under which the Company agrees to supply electric service to
a customer and under which the customer agrees to accept
service from the company (R. 70).
Regulations No. 18 and 24 are particularly pertinent
to the instant case.

Said regulations read as follows:

THE SUPPLYING AND TAKING OF SERVICE
18. Continuity of Service. The Company
shall use reasonable diligence to provice steady and continuous service, but
does not guarantee its service against
irregularities and interruptions. The
Company having used reasonable diligence
shall not be liable to Customers for any
damages occasioned by irregularities or
interruptions.
22. Customer's Responsibility. The
Customer assumes all responsbility on
Customer's side of the Point of Delivery
for service supplied or taken, as well
as for the electrical installation and
appliances used in connection therewith,
and will indemnify, save harmless and
defend the Company against all claims,
demands, costs or expense, for loss,
damage or injury to persons or property,
in any manner directly or indirectly
connected with, or growing out of, the
transmission or use of electric service
by the Customer, at or on the Customer's
side of the Point of Delivery.
"

Plaintiff Anschutz's knowledge and acceptance of its

responsibility for all repairs on the Customer's side of the
point of delivery is clearly evidenced by the testimony of
its manager, Mr. Arneson.

He was specifically asked if Hatch

(Anschutz) Ranch accepted responsibility for repairs on the
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- 22 users side of the meter and he answered affirmatively
(R. 27).

I
Defendant has been unable to find any case where

this court has considered a situation involving a claimed
breach of a public utility agreement.

Plaintiffs cite cases

from other jurisdictions and defendant could likewise supply
similar cases in support of its position.

Such cases,

however, from other jurisdictions, are of little value here
because they do not involve the specific qualifying conditions contained in the Electric Service Regulations, as
quoted above, relative to the supplying and taking of
service applicable to the Deseret agreement and to the
service agreements with all other customers of Utah Power.
With respect to the implied agreement to supply
service to Anschutz, the result is the same.

All electric

service supplied by Utah Power was and is subject to the
Electric Service Regulations filed as a part of the tariffs
for such service.

To hold that the service provided by the

Company to a particular customer was not subject to same
would not only be discriminatory as to other customers but
would directly circumvent the jurisdiction and authority of
the Public Service Commission.

The Commission's jurisdic-

tion in this area is clear. Section 54-4-1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, vests the Commission with
jurisdiction ". . .to supervise and regulate every public
utility in this state and to supervise all of the business
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- 23 of each such public utility in this state . . . ." The
Commission's responsibility with regard to rules and regulations applicable to the furnishing of utility service is set
forth in §54-4-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
wherein it is provided in part that:
. . . the Commission shall have power
after a hearing to ascertain and fix
just and reasonable standards, classifications, regulations, practices, measurements of the service to be furnished,
imposed, observed and followed by all
electrical, gas and water corporations;
. . . . (Emphasis added)
The service agreement and regulations are specifically
clear in stating that Utah Power does not guarantee its
service against irregularities and further that the customer
assumes all responsibility on its side of the point of
delivery for service supplied.

With such language applicable

to the agreements in question, the trial court could not
conclude otherwise than that there was no breach of contract
by defendant.
;

..,

POINT V

.

;

THE TRIAL COURT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE
WAS NO IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS APPLICABLE TO
THE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLIED BY DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFFS
The trial court, in addition to its conclusion
that there was no breach of the agreement to supply plaintiffs
with electric power further concluded that defendant made no
specific or implied warranties as to the supply of such
power.
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- 24 At the outset reference is again made to the
e

Electric Service Regulations set forth in Point IV above
relative to the supply and taking of electric service.

The

specific disclaimer of a guarantee in Regulation No. 18,
and the specific assumption by the customer, in Regulation
No. 22, of all responsibility on its side of the point of
delivery for service taken, fully negates the imposition of
any implied warranties applicable to the relationship between
the parties.

Such conclusion applies not only to Deseret

with whom a specific written service agreement is in evidence
but applies equally to Anschutz inasmuch as the aforesaid
regulations are a part of Utah Power's tariffs, designated
as P.S.C.U. No. 8, filed with and approved by the Public
Service Commission of Utah and are applicable to all electric
service supplied to all customers within the state of Utah.
The principal that the provisions of a utility's
filed service regulations cover the business relationship
between such utility and its customers, and are binding on
both, is firmly established and this is true irrespective of
the existence of a formal written agreement to supply service.
While no Utah cases on the subject were found, many decisions
are available from other jurisdictions.

In Cullinane

v. Potomac Electric Power, 147 A.2d 768 (D. C. 1959),
the court held that an electric companyfs rules and regulations, filed with and approved by the regulatory agency,
entered into contracts made with the utility and are binding
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- 25 on both the customer and the utility in the absence of any
unfair practice on the part of the utility; actual knowledge
thereof or assent is legally immaterial.

In Carroway v.

Carolina Power and Light Company, 84 S.E.2d 728 (So. Car.
1954), the court said the utility company's service regulations,
on file with and approved by the Public Service Commission,
have the force and effect of law and are binding on the
plaintiff regardless of whether or not he agreed to them.
Further, in Illinois Bell Telephone Company v. Miner, 136
N.E.2d 1 (111. 1956), it was held that a telephone company's
tariffs on file with the Commission is a necessary component
and integral part of its contract and relationships with
subscribers and the subscribers are bound thereby and cannot
deviate therefrom.

To the same effect is a Federal Court of

Appeals ruling in Slenderella Systems v. Pacific Telephone
and Telegraph, 286 F.2d 488 (1966).

Similarly, it was held

in Wilkinson v. New England Telephone Company, 97 N.E.2d 413
(Mass. 1951) that the obligation of the telephone company to
render service to a subscriber is limited by its regulations
which, on filing, become an integral part of the relationship
with the subscriber.
Clearly there were no written or express warranties
made by Utah Power to Deseret or Anschutz.

To the contrary,

the intention not to so warrant is evident from Electric
Service Regulations Nos. 18 and 22 and the conditions stated
therein applicable to the supplying and taking of electric
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- 26 service.

This clear expression of the intended utility-

customer relationship fully supports the trial court's
conclusion that no implied warranties were made or contemplated
by the parties.
CONCLUSION
The trial court, based upon the evidence presented,
properly granted defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

The Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law made and entered by the trial
court were fully supported by competent and substantial
evidence,

The Judgment of Dismissal by the lower court

should be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,
S. G. BAUCOM
ROBERT GORDON
Attorneys for Respondent
P. 0. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah
84110
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- 27 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The foregoing Brief of Respondents was served on
Plaintiffs-Appellants this 6th day of June, 1975, by
mailing copies of same, postage prepaid, to their attorneys,
David A. Robinson, 531 South State Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, and Richard L. Bird, 333 East 400 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111.
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